Chumrot in Halacha

 

I have become very confused recently, specifically about the concepts sometimes intermixed when discussing Jewish “law.”

I vaguely recall a story in which a famous gadol of a rav is approached by his students (apologies if you know this story and I’m getting the details wrong). The students pointed out that he consistently issued chumrot and they wondered if he ever ruled leniently. He agreed with their point and decided to issue 3 leniencies. I recall that one went something like “you aren’t supposed to learn Torah on the eve of the 9^th of Av but I will rule that you can” or something like that. The point is that what students considered additional study/effort was what he was recontextualizing as a leniency because he created an allowance when the law/practice(?) (in the eyes of students) absolved them of that responsibility, if only for a short time. The "strict" reading stopped learning and the leniency allowed it. But wwhich one, if either was a stringency or a leniency?

Law in Judaism, halacha (the way to be) trace back to a few different sources – black letter text, textual inferences, statements in the oral law, expansions of application, edicts (time based and continuing) and adjudicated precedents are a few.

One idea which has always been a thorn for me is the idea of “rulings” – give a rabbi a fact pattern and he will apply a law and show what the practical application is. However, this ruling will be non-exportable, dependent only on the most local facts and accounting for unique variables. This allows rabbis to rule “leniently,” that is, looking for exceptions or interpretations which don’t require applying the law in its most stringent iteration. What is important to remember, though, is that the entire range of applications has to be considered valid “law” because in a given case, a different ruling might be issued an be equally valid though contradictory on the surface.

Take a case in which someone mixes up meat and dairy appliances and uses the wrong one for the wrong food. In certain cases, one dimension to be considered is the financial loss to the individual. If it is substantial, the rabbi can find a way to allow the appliance to continue to be used. This must then be as reasonable and valid an application of the law as a ruling invalidating the use of the appliance. The statement “kosher” is as valid as “not kosher” – in a sense, both are true and only an external context decides which is invoked. This even holds true on a communal level – what is acceptable for an entire community might not be for another. Some laws are designed only for certain locations (walled cities and Shushan Purim, for example) and some practices developed based on geography, like the ban on Kitniyot for Ashkenazic Jews. Food on Pesach made by Sephardim is still kosher; it is only the accepted norm which applies to only some which makes the food forbidden.

The gemara, in Masechet Chullin, 18b discusses the law when someone moves from place to place. In the discussion at hand, regarding the exact location of a shochet’s cut in order to create a kosher animal, one community accepts a cut that another would not. The resultant animal is then, in a sense, both kosher and non-kosher depending on the person. If a person moves (unless he is moving from Bavel to Israel), the gemara explains, he is held to the stricter standard. But does that apply to all “law” types? Is the understanding that schechita must be at one place a chumra/stringency? Or is it simply an understanding of the law that developed via a different tradition? What about a local minhag (as minhag, on at least one level carries the force of law)? Is a minhag a stringency?

In Pesachim, 50a, the policy is applied to locations where the practice is not to work on the eve of Passover. The text discusses a thing which is permitted but the people have a minhag/practice of considering it assur/forbidden. But the limits of this application are not discussed.

I considered applying this to the question of keeping 2 days of Yom Tov outside of Israel. Is that a chumra or just a unique ruling, or a different application of law? When people travel, is this rule about stringencies applicable? What exactly is a chumra? On which kinds of “laws” would it apply?

Just a bunch of questions for today…

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Extra notes -- there is an halachic concept known as Yuhara (arrogance). One may not accept a stringency upon himself because it would look like he is counting himself as a particular scholar. But the question of "stringency" can shift based on the popular practice and isn't even clear

see https://dinonline.org/2011/08/05/yuhara-laws-of-arrogance/ for more confusion

Also, there is a concept of minhag chasidus which is acceptable (though in some cases, not so acceptable) but that isn't always clearly a forbidding of that which is permitted; it is often just doing soemthing others don't do, but it isn't clear when and if that is, or ever was, haughtiness.